Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting 1994 Transcript

Introduction: What do you need to know about the 1994 meeting?
TL;DR: The key numbers of the 1994 meeting, Berkshire’s share price against the market, the people on stage and the key takeaways for long-term investors.


- Peter Bevelin · Swedish investor and author of the book Seeking Wisdom · Q9
- Bill Ackman · Investor from New York. Then at Gotham Partners, later founder of Pershing Square · Q15
- David Samra · Value investor from San Francisco, today a portfolio manager at Artisan Partners · Q26
- Byron Wien · Investment strategist at Morgan Stanley in New York · Q64
- The stock market sometimes sells great businesses cheap. Buffett said he and Munger never have an opinion on the market. Lower prices help Berkshire because it keeps buying. Berkshire held well over 1 billion dollars in cash, which Buffett called an index of failure because he had not found enough to buy. [01:40:43] [01:42:17] [01:43:59] [02:12:40]
“The market, in the stock market, you get a chance to buy businesses at foolish prices, and that is why we end up with a lot of money in marketable securities.” (Buffett, [01:46:15]) - Bet big only on what you truly understand. Buffett prefers businesses he can understand and ignores projections from sellers. Munger quoted Mark Twain on mines. Buffett bought his first stock in April 1942, at age 11, and said guesses about the economy should never stop a good business decision. [01:21:53] [01:23:02] [01:24:26] [01:25:14] [01:41:32]
“it’s not crazy, if you understand the business well and if the price is sufficiently attractive, to put a very significant percentage of your net worth in.” (Buffett, [02:57:26]) - Risk is the chance of harm over time. Buffett said volatility and beta do not measure risk. What matters is the chance of harm over the time you plan to hold. He warned that leverage combined with ignorance can end badly, as when Procter & Gamble moved from soap to writing puts on bonds. [00:13:56] [00:15:00] [01:55:31] [01:56:33] [01:57:32]
- Growth is good only when it needs little capital. A business that grows without needing capital beats one that eats all its cash to grow, Buffett and Munger said. [03:22:11] [03:22:59] [03:23:26]
- The CEO must allocate capital himself. Buffett and Munger make every capital decision themselves, with no staff for it and almost nobody at headquarters. Buffett said most CEOs are never trained for this job. Munger said most corporate buyers spend somebody else’s money, while Berkshire buys with its own. [01:47:53] [03:24:29] [03:25:14] [03:27:03]
- Cheap float is worth the rare big loss. Insurance float grew from about 20 million to close to 3 billion dollars, Buffett said, at a very attractive cost. A worst case super cat could cost Berkshire 600 to 700 million dollars, against super cat premiums of about 250 million dollars that year. [00:22:32] [00:23:39] [01:12:35] [01:13:59]
- Judge a manager by results and fairness to owners. Buffett said poor managers also tend to care little about shareholders. He praised Deryck, Bob Denham and John Macfarlane for keeping Salomon running in August 1991. He said the managers of his shoe companies would have succeeded in any business. [00:57:58] [00:59:53] [01:00:50] [01:01:31] [01:05:43]
“the ones that in my view or the poor managers also turn out to be the ones that really don’t think that much about the shareholders, too. The two often go hand in hand.” (Buffett, [00:29:41])
Salomon · Capital Cities/ABC · Guinness · Coca-Cola (KO) · USAir · Wesco Financial · Fannie Mae · Freddie Mac · World Book · General Dynamics (GD)
National Indemnity · Central States Indemnity · Homestate Companies · Cypress · Nebraska Furniture Mart · Borsheim’s · See’s Candies · Buffalo News · H.H. Brown · Dexter Shoe · Lowell Shoe · Fechheimer · Precision Steel · Scott Fetzer · K&W · Blue Chip Stamps · Mutual Savings and Loan
The Washington Post · GEICO · Gillette · Procter & Gamble (PG) · Wells Fargo (WFC) · SunTrust · National City · Wrigley · Nike (NKE) · Reebok · Microsoft (MSFT) · Philip Morris · UST · LVMH · General Electric (GE) · Merck (MRK) · Encyclopaedia Britannica · Webb and Knapp · Midwest Express · Southwest Airlines (LUV)
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Get ready for 2027How did Warren Buffett open the 1994 meeting?
TL;DR: Buffett joked about the move from a museum to an old vaudeville theater. He said attendance was up about 600 and that Charlie Munger got no negative votes.

Now, certain implications to that, because as some of the more experienced, you know, a few years ago we were holding this meeting at the Joslyn Museum, which is a temple of culture, and we’ve now, of course, moved to an old vaudeville theater. And the only place in town that can hold us next year, I think, is the Ak-Sar-Ben Coliseum, where they have keno and racetracks. We are sliding down the cultural chain, as just as Charlie predicted years ago. He saw this coming.
Charlie, I have some rather distressing news to report. The… there are always a few people that vote against everyone on the slate for directors, and there’s maybe a dozen or so people do that, and then there are others that single shot it and they pick out people to vote against. And this will come as news to Charlie, I haven’t told them yet, but he is the only one among our candidates for directors that receive no negative votes this year. Holy, holy. No need to applaud. I’ll tell you, when you lose out the title of Miss Congeniality to Charlie, you know you’re in trouble.
With it, now, I’d like to tell you a little bit how we’ll run this. We will have the business meeting in a hurry, with cooperation of all of you, and then we will introduce our managers who are here, and then we will have a Q&A period. We will run that until 12 o’clock, at which point we’ll break, and then at 12:15, if the hardcore want to stick around, we will have another hour or so, until about 1, of questions. So you’re free to leave, of course, any time. And I’ve pointed out in the past that it’s much better form if you leave while Charlie is talking rather than when I’m talking. But the… feel free anytime. But you can… you, if you’re panicked and you’re worried about being conspicuous by leaving, you will be able to leave it at noon. We will have buses out front that will take you to the hotels or the airport or to hunt that will take you to the hotels or the airport or to any place in town in which we have a commercial interest. And we encourage you staying around on that basis.
What happened at the business meeting, and which managers came?
TL;DR: Walter Scott Jr. moved the motions and the six directors were elected. Buffett then introduced the managers of the Berkshire businesses and explained the zones for questions.
Let’s have the… let’s get the business of the meeting out of the way, then we get onto more interesting things. I will first introduce the Berkshire Hathaway directors that are probably… directors that are present in addition to myself. And first of all there’s Charlie, who is the vice chairman of Berkshire. And if the rest of you will stand, we have Susan T. Buffett, Howard Buffett, Malcolm Chase III, and Walter Scott Jr. And that’s it.
Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte & Touche, our auditors, Mr. Ron Burgess and Mr. Craig Christensen. They are available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire. Mr. Forrest Krutter, secretary, Berkshire. He will make a written record of the proceedings. Mr. Robert M. Fitzsimmons has been appointed inspector of election at this meeting. He will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors. The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott Jr. and Marc D. Hamburg.
Proxy cards have been returned through last Friday representing 1,035,680 Berkshire shares to be voted by the proxy holders as indicated on the cards. That number of shares represents a quorum, and we will therefore directly proceed with a meeting. We will conduct the business, the meeting, and adjourn to the formal meeting, and then adjourn the formal meeting. After that, we will entertain questions that you might have. In the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders, I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr., who will place a motion before the meeting.
WSWalter Scott Jr. [00:05:07] I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting the shareholders be dispensed with.

FKForrest Krutter [00:05:31] Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent by first class mail to all shareholders of record on March 8, 1994, being the record date for this meeting, there were 1,177,750 shares of Berkshire common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting. Of that number, 1,035,680 shares are represented at this meeting by proxies return through last Friday.

WSWalter Scott Jr. [00:06:38] I move that Warren Buffett, Susan Buffett, Howard Buffett, Malcolm Chase, Charles Munger, and Walter Scott be elected as directors.

RFRobert Fitzsimmons [00:07:27] My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders received through last Friday cast not less than 1,035,407 votes for each nominee. That number far exceeds the majority of the number of all shares outstanding, and a more precise count cannot change the results of the election. However, the certification required by Delaware law regarding the precise count of the votes, including the votes cast in person at this meeting, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

WSWalter Scott Jr. [00:08:20] I move the meeting be adjourned.

Now I’d like to introduce some of the people that make this place work to you. And if you would hold your applause until the end, because there are quite a number of our managers here. I’m not sure which ones for sure are here, some of them may be out attending the store as well. But first of all, from the Nebraska Furniture Mart, are we… Louie, Ron, and Irv Blumkin. I’m not sure who’s here, but would you stand, please? The… any of the Blumkins that are present? Okay, we… looks like earbuds, I can’t quite see it. Yeah. From Borsheims, Susan Jacques here? Susan, there she is. Susan had a record day yesterday. She just… (Applause) Susan became CEO just a few months ago and she’s turning in records already. Keep it up.
And from Central States Indemnity, we have the Kizers. I’m not sure which ones are here, but there’s Bill Senior, Bill Jr., John, and Dick. Kizer. Stayed. Think I can see him. John. Don Wurster from National Indemnity. Rod Eldred from the Homestate Companies. Brad Kinstler from Cypress, our workers comp company. Ajit Jain, the big, big ticket writer in the East. And Mike Goldberg, who runs our real estate finance group, generally oversees the insurance group. Mike. Gary Heldman from Fechheimers. Chuck Huggins from See’s, the candy man. Stan Lipsey from the Buffalo News. Chuck’s been with us, incidentally, 20 odd years. Stan’s been working with me for well over 25 years. Frank Rooney and Jim Issler from H.H. Brown. Dave Hillstrom from Precision Steel. Ralph Schey from Scott Fetzer. Peter Lunder, who was with our newest acquisition, Dexter Shoe. And Harold Alfond, his partner, couldn’t be with us because his wife is ill.
And finally, the manager that’s been with Charlie and me the longest, Harry Bottle from K&W. Harry here? There, there’s Harry. Yeah. Harry saved our bacon back in 1962 or so, when in some mad moment I went into the windmill business, and Harry got me out of it. That’s our group of managers, and I appreciate it if you give them a hand.
I have one piece of good news about next year for you. In addition to moving to larger quarters, they’re going to add non-stop air service from New York, Washington, and Los Angeles here in the next few months, Midwest Express. So I hope they do very well with it, and I hope that makes it easier for you to get into town.
And now, in this, for the next two hours and 15 minutes or so, we’ll have a session where we will take questions. We have seven zones, three on the main floor. We’ll go start over there with zone one and work across on the main floor. If you’ll raise your hand, the person who’s handling the mic will pass it to you, and we’ll try to not repeat in any individual in any one zone until everyone in that zone has had a chance to ask one question. So after you’ve been on once, let other people get a shot. When we move up to the loge, we have one person there, and in the case… and then we have three in the balcony, which is essentially full now. And we would, up there, we would appreciate it if you would leave your seat and go to the person with the mic. It’ll be a little easier in both the loge and the balcony to handle it that way. And if you’ll go a little ahead of time, that way if there’s a line of two or three, you can line up for questions in both the loge and the balcony.
So, whatever you’d care to ask. If you want an optimistic answer, you’ll of course direct your question to Charlie. Like a little more realism, you’ll come to me. And let’s start over in zone one. Sometimes we can’t see too well from up here, but, in fact, I can’t even see the monitor right now. But I said, do we have one over there? And if you’ll identify yourself by name and your hometown, we’d appreciate it.
What did Buffett say about derivatives, Cap Cities and discount rates?
TL;DR: Buffett said ignorance plus borrowed money leads to trouble. He explained the Cap Cities tender and said he would discount cash flows at 10% or more.
What is the danger in derivatives?
[00:13:41] Shareholder (Michael Mullen, Omaha): My name is Michael Mullen from Omaha. Would you comment on the use of derivatives? I noticed Dell Computer stock was off two and a half points Friday with the loss and derivatives.

And you’ve seen that, of course, recently with a recent Procter & Gamble announcement. Now, I don’t know the details of the P&G derivatives, but I understand, at least, that what started out as interest rate swaps ended up with P&G writing puts on large quantities of US and, I think, one other country’s bonds. And any time you go from selling soap to writing puts on bonds, you’ve made a big jump. And it… the ability to borrow enormous amounts of money, combined with the chance to get either very rich or very poor very quickly, has historically been a recipe for trouble at some point. And that… derivatives are not going to go away. They serve useful purposes and all that, but I’m just saying that it has that potential, and we’ve seen a little bit of that. I can’t think of anything that we’ve done that… would you think of anything we do that approaches derivatives, surely directly?




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Why did Berkshire tender Cap Cities shares?
[00:16:44] Shareholder (Hugh Stevenson, Atlanta): My name is Hugh Stevenson, I’m a shareholder from Atlanta. My question involves the company’s investment in the stock of Cap Cities. It’s been my understanding in the past that that was regarded as one of the four, quote unquote, permanent holdings of the company. I was a little bit confused by the disposition of 1 million shares. Could you clarify that? Was my previous misunderstanding… was my previous understanding incorrect, or has there been some change, or is there a third possibility?



What minimum cash flow yield does Berkshire need?
[00:19:03] Shareholder (Howard Baskam, Kansas City): Good morning. My name is Howard Baskam, I’m from Kansas City, and I’ve got a theoretical value question for you. If you were to buy a business and you bought it at its intrinsic value, what’s the minimum after tax free cash flow yield you’d need to get?

[00:19:35] Shareholder (Howard Baskam, Kansas City): No, what’s the minimum current after tax free cash flow yield?





Why is insurance worth far more than book value?
[00:22:04] Shareholder (Omaha, Nebraska): More spins from Omaha, Nebraska. You’ve made comments on several locations about the intrinsic business value of the insurance operations, and in this year’s report you state that insurance business possesses an intrinsic value that exceeds book value by a large amount, larger in fact then is the case that any Berkshire… other Berkshire business. I was wondering if you would explain in greater detail why you believe that to be true.

And just to pick an example, last year, when we actually had an underwriting profit, the value of that float was something over $200 million. And that figure was a lot bigger than it was 10 years ago or 20 years ago. So that’s… that is a stream. Last year was unusually favorable, but that is a… that’s a very significant stream of earnings, and it’s one we feel we have reasonably good prospects in. So we feel very good about the insurance business. Not the insurance business. Okay, zone five.
What did Munger say about a stock split, and how do you judge managers?
TL;DR: Munger called carving Berkshire into 20 dollar pieces almost insane. Buffett said to judge managers by how they run the business and how they treat owners.
Will Berkshire ever split its stock?
[00:24:15] Shareholder (Jimmy Ryden Maker, Omaha): Name is Jimmy Ryden Maker from Omaha. Is there any point at which your stock would rise to the point where you might split the stock?





Will nonstop flights replace The Indefensible?
[00:26:44] Shareholder (Rob Naw, Omaha, Nebraska): I’m… Mr. Buffett, my name is Rob Naw, I’m from Omaha, Nebraska. My question is, given the recent announcement of Midwest Express and their non-stop jet service between the East and West Coast, will this cut down on your use of The Indefensible, and will you use more commercial air travel?



How can an average investor judge management?
[00:28:06] Shareholder (Allan Maxwell, Omaha): Mr. Buffett, my name is Allan Maxwell from Omaha. I’ve got two questions. What is your next goal in life now that you’re the richest man in the country?

[00:28:28] Shareholder (Allan Maxwell, Omaha): Secondly, you talk about good management with corporations and that you try and buy companies with good management. I feel that I have about as much chance of meeting good managers, other than yourself, as I do bringing Richard Nixon back to life. How do I have, as an average investor, find out what good management is?

And then the second thing you want to figure out is how well that they treat their owners. And I think you can get a handle on that oftentimes. A lot of times you can’t. I mean, there are many… there are many companies that obviously fall in somewhere in that 20th to 80th percentile. It’s a little hard to pick out where they do fall. But I think you can usually figure out… I mean, it is not… it’s not hard to figure out that, say, Bill Gates or Tom Murphy, Don Keough, or people like that are really outstanding managers, and hard to figure out who they’re working for. And I could give you some cases on the other end of the spectrum, too. It’s interesting how often the ones that in my view or the poor managers also turn out to be the ones that really don’t think that much about the shareholders, too. The two often go hand in hand.
But I think reading of reports, reading of competitors’ reports, I think you’ll get a fix on that in some cases. You don’t have to… you know, you don’t have to make 100 correct judgments in this business, are 50 correct judgments. You only have to make a few, and that’s all we try to do. And generally speaking, the conclusions I’ve come to about managers have really come about the same way you could make yours. I mean, they’ve come about by reading reports rather than any intimate personal knowledge or knowing them personally at all. So it… you know, read the proxy statements, see what… see what they think of, see how they treat themselves versus how they treat the shareholders, and look at what they have accomplished, considering what the hand was that they were dealt when they took over, compared to what is going on in the industry. And I think you can figure it out sometimes. You don’t have to figure it out very often. Charlie?


How does Berkshire keep a manager like Ajit Jain?
[00:31:42] Shareholder (Liam, Palo Alto, California): Hi there. My name is Liam from Palo Alto, California. In meeting Ajit Jain, I’ve been very impressed over the years. I think I even met his parents once, they came from India. Please comment on your deepest impressions of his personality and managerial skills, and also how you go about exactly keeping somebody with such fine skills within the fold. You might go to Walt Disney someday and, you know, pull down 200 million.

And we basically attack that the same way we look at what they do, the same way we look at what we do. We’ve got a wonderful group of shareholders. Before I ran this, I had a partnership. I had a great group of partners, and essentially I like to be left alone to do what I did. I like to be judged on the scorecard at the end of the year rather than on every stroke, and not second guessed in a way that was inappropriate. I like to have people who understood the environment in which I was operating. And so the important thing we do with managers, generally, is to find the .400 hitters and then not tell them how to swing, as I put in the report. Second thing we do is allocate capital. And aside from that, we play bridge. That’s pretty much what happens at Berkshire.
So with any of the managers you might name here, we try to make it interesting and fun for them to run their business. We try to have a compensation arrangement that’s appropriate for the kind of business there, and we have no company-wide compensation plan. We wouldn’t dream of having some compensation expert consultant come in and screw it up. We try to… some businesses require a lot of capital that we’re in, some require no capital. Some are easy businesses where good profit margins are a cinch to come by, but we’re really paying for the extra beyond that. Some are very tough businesses to make money in. And it would be crazy to have some huge framework that we tried to place everybody in, that were one size would fit all. People generally are compensated relating in some manner that relates to how their business does, as opposed to… there’s no reason to pay anybody based on how Berkshire does, because no one has responsibility for Berkshire except for Charlie and me. And we try to make them responsible for their own units, compensated based on how those units do. We try to understand the businesses they’re in, so we know what the difference between a good performance and a bad performance. It’s… and that’s about… that’s how we work with people.
We’ve had terrific luck over the years in retaining the managers that we wanted to retain. And it’s, I think, largely it’s because, particularly, they sell us a business that, to a great extent, the next day they’re running it just as they were the day before, and they’re having as much fun running their business as I have running Berkshire. Charlie?






What did Buffett say about Guinness, succession and Blue Chip Stamps?
TL;DR: Buffett did not expect much volume growth for Scotch. He said Berkshire would do fine without him, and he joked about the decline of Blue Chip Stamps.
What are the long-term growth prospects of Guinness?
[00:37:10] Shareholder (Peter Bevelin, Sweden): My name is Peter Bevelin from Sweden. How do you perceive Guinness long-term economics, growth-wise? The…

[00:37:31] Shareholder (Peter Bevelin, Sweden): Growth-wise, Guinness.



There are some countries around the world where it’s grown, and there’s certain countries where it’s a huge prestige item. I mean, in certain parts of the Far East, the more you pay for Scotch, the better you think people think of you, which I don’t understand completely, but I hope it continues. But the Scotch… worldwide Scotch consumption has not been anything to write home about. Guinness makes a lot of money in the business, but I would not… I don’t see anything in the… in published history that would lead you to believe that the growth prospects in terms of physical volume are high for Scotch. The Guinness itself, the beer, actually is shown pretty good growth rates in some countries, actually from a very tiny base in the US as well. But they will have to do well in distilling, or, I mean, that will govern the outcome of the Guinness. I think Guinness is well run, and it’s a… it’s a very important company in that business, but I wouldn’t count on a lot of physical growth. Charlie, what, any consumer insights?


What happens to Berkshire if something happens to Buffett?
[00:39:52] Shareholder (Arthur Collis, Canton, Massachusetts): Mr. Buffett, my name is Arthur Collis from Canton, Massachusetts, and I’d like to know how you respond to the question that my associates ask me when they say that Berkshire Hathaway has been a good investment up to now, but if, God forbid, something happens to Mr. Warren Buffett.

And it is not… it’s not a complicated business. I mean, you ought to worry more about, if you own Microsoft, about Bill Gates, I think, or something of sort. But this place is… you know, we’ve got a group down here that are running these. You didn’t see me out of Borsheim’s selling any jewelry the other day. I mean, that’s somebody else’s job. So I… and it is not… it’s not very complicated. I, incidentally, I think I’m in pretty good health. I mean, this stuff will do wonders for you if you’ll just try it. Charlie, do you want to add anything? Is the…




Would Berkshire consider a reverse split?
[00:43:00] Shareholder (Al Martin): First of all, my name is Al Martin, and my wife Terry is here with me, and I appreciate the invitation to attend this meeting. I was a little bit dubious and quite excited at that game Saturday night. I didn’t know which side was going to throw the game to the other one, but I did find out at the end. The first question actually was somewhat answered, but not fully. Has the board considered a reverse split? My experience has been that…

[00:43:41] Shareholder (Al Martin): I would say a two for one, because if it were three or four for one, I might end up with no shares or fractional shares. But anyway, my experience has been that all the stocks that have split have gone down in the next two or three months, or the next two or three years, including one which you are drinking, which is a flat Coke. Also, I have observed Merck over the last several years to be hitting a low, which split three for one. So I think that, you know, the reasons for splitting stocks are to make it affordable. I found that every stock ever board was never affordable. I found the reason I bought it was because I couldn’t afford not to buy it. So that’s a different philosophy, I guess, that’s somewhat shared indirectly with the board’s running of the stock. The second question, which is, has to do with…

[00:44:41] Shareholder (Al Martin): Well, I didn’t want to wait for an answer the first question for that reason, because it could be complicated and confusing and so forth. The second question has to do with, could the board consider looking into a commodity broker or a lawyer or both that could take action similar to Hillary… Hillary Clinton’s? I think, you know, making your net worth go up by a factor of five overnight is more than enticing. Some of us might even want to wait for 10 months to get a 100 to one return on the money.

[00:45:52] Shareholder (Al Martin): That was my second question. Of course, in my experience, it’s been that most of us have thought through this situation, and I guess it’s pretty speculative, but I found out that the rules and laws that are made for trading are interpreted rather than enforced, and I think that applied to this particular case. So let’s go on to the third question.

[00:46:17] Shareholder (Al Martin): This one is real easy. My wife was a collector of Blue Chip Stamps for many, many years, and she bought some stamps with her. What should she do with them?







Going back, incidentally, you’re the point on the split, I appears… going back, incidentally, here to point on the split, I think most people think that the stock would sell for more money split. A… we wouldn’t necessarily think that was advisable in the first place, but we, in the second place, we don’t think it would necessarily be true over a period of time. We think our stock is more likely to be rationally priced over time following the present policies than if we were to split it in some major way. And we don’t think the average price would necessarily be higher. We think that the volatility would probably be somewhat greater, and we see no way that volatility helps our shareholders as a group. Zone five.
Should Buffett push Greenspan to stop raising rates?
[00:48:38] Shareholder (Peg Gallagher, Omaha): I am Peg Gallagher from Omaha. Mr. Buffett, are you interested in influencing Mr. Greenspan at the Fed to stop raising interest rates?

But the… I don’t… I think what he has done is probably been somewhat appropriate. I think he’s probably been surprised a little bit as to what has happened with long-term rates as he’s nudged up short-term rates. I think he was hoping that, this is just a guess on my part, that the action sort of early in the cycle on the short-term rate front would… might make people feel more confident about the longer-term rates, and therefore that the yield curve would flatten some. I don’t know that, and he may have been a little surprised on that. But it’s not an easy job he has, so I would not second guess him myself. Charlie, how do you feel about him?


How do Buffett and Munger view accounting, bank buybacks and Salomon?
TL;DR: Buffett said Berkshire cares about economics, not accounting treatment. He thanked the three men who kept Salomon alive in 1991.
What did Buffett think of the Barron’s valuation article?
[00:50:30] Shareholder (Lee Miller, St. Louis): Mr. Buffett, I’m Lee Miller from St. Louis. There was an article in the April 18th Barron’s that attempted to calculate the value behind each Berkshire Hathaway share. I’m sure you have some views on that, and I’d be very interested in your perspective on that issue.

Should banks buy back more of their stock?
[00:52:37] Shareholder (Edward Barr, Lexington, Kentucky): I’m Edward Barr from Lexington, Kentucky, and I’d like to ask, given the amount of capital in the banking industry, do you think that more banks should be buying back significant amounts of their stock, like SunTrust, versus just the token amounts that they’re buying back, or just the authorized amounts? And then also, related question and banking, are they… are banks too focused on goodwill amortization when declining to buy other banks for cash, thereby using purchase accounting, versus the normal practice in the industry of pooling accounting, even when the stock they issue may be depressed or undervalued?

Your second question, about goodwill amortization and purchase accounting versus pooling, we care not at Berkshire. It absolutely makes no difference to us what accounting treatment we get on something. We are interested in the economics of a transaction. Some banks, some businesses generally, most businesses perhaps, prefer pooling because they don’t like to take a goodwill amortization charge. We think our shareholders are smart enough, particularly if we make it clear to them the accounting consequences, we think they’re smart enough to look through the economic reality of what Berkshire’s businesses are all about. And I think that… I think some managements sell short their own ownership group by doing various kinds of financial acrobatics in order to have the charges come in a certain way, rather than, as you point out, often they might be better off buying for cash rather than their own stock as currency, but they may prefer to use their own stock because they avoid goodwill charges.
We’ve written a few things on goodwill in the past and past annual reports, that might get to that subject. We don’t care what accounting… we sort of rewrite the accounting for any business that we’re looking at, because in our heads we want to have, in effect, a standardized way of looking at businesses. And if one company goes through pooling transactions and another goes through purchase transactions, we’re going to recast them in our own mind so that there’s comparability. Charlie?




Why does Berkshire like Salomon despite its leverage?
[00:57:27] Shareholder (Bill Ackman, New York City): Mr. Buffett, my name is Bill Ackman, I’m from New York City, and my question relates to the appeal of Salomon Brothers as an investment. You talked earlier about leverage and the dangers of leverage. Salomon is a business which is levered 30 to one, which has very narrow margins and earns relatively modest return on equity in light of the amount of leverage that they use. What is the appeal of the business to you?

It’s the sort of business that, as you point out, uses a lot of leverage. It doesn’t… in one way it doesn’t use as much as it looks like, in another way it uses even more than it looks like. But it… the test will be, A, whether they control that business in a way that that leverage does not prove dangerous, and secondly, what kind of returns on equity they earn while using it. You certainly should expect to earn somewhat higher returns on equity when you are necessarily exposed to a small amount of systemic risk and significant amounts of borrowed money than you would in a business that’s… that’s an extremely plain vanilla business. But I don’t know whether you’ve met Bob and Deryck, but I think you’d feel better about having a leverage in their hands than about any other hands you can imagine. Charlie?


Bob Denham, I called, I guess, on the 20 or so… 20th. I called him on a Friday, I got home on Saturday, 24th of August. He was living a nice, pleasant, peaceful life in California, and it had a first class law firm, good group of clients, wife had a good job there. And I told him I was in a mess and there wasn’t any second choice, and three days later he was back in New York and living in a small apartment in Battery City, and handling the general counsel’s job at Salomon.
They found John Macfarlane on that Sunday, on the 18th. I think he was running on a triathlon or something, at a practice that Charlie and I follow. But they… and he was yanked from that and came down. And I think John lives over in New Jersey, but he holed up in the Downtown Athletic Club, and it was his job to keep funding what was then a $150 billion balance sheet, during a period when people right and left were cancelling, is not because we weren’t a good credit, but because they just didn’t want to have anything to do with us for a while. And the World Bank and the State of Texas pension fund and CalPERS, all these people were shutting off funding at a time. And funding in a business, as a gentleman just indicated, is the lifeblood of a… of an enterprise like Salomon. And so those three deserve an enormous hand, by really… by the Salomon shareholders, but by this group in turn, because we have an important investment. So I thank them publicly. Zone two.
What makes the shoe business work, and how big is the super cat risk?
TL;DR: Buffett credited the shoe managers, not the industry. He said a worst case super cat could cost Berkshire 600 to 700 million dollars.
Why did Wesco sell Mutual Savings and Loan?
[01:02:37] Shareholder (Kelly Ranson, San Antonio, Texas): I’m Kelly Ranson from San Antonio, Texas, and I wondered if you could comment on the Mutual Savings and Loan. There was just a footnote that the deposits had been assumed by a federal savings bank. And also, what about the annual report for Wesco Financial? That I know it used to be in the annual report for Berkshire. I just wondered if you could comment on that, please.





What makes Berkshire’s shoe businesses attractive?
[01:05:26] Shareholder (Chicago): Chicago. Can you speak to some of the economic characteristics of the shoe industry that allowed the business to be profitable and, in your view, attractive?

[01:05:39] Unidentified speaker: He wanted you to comment on the merits of the shoe industry.

And I think that, to the extent we can find ways to expand in the shoe business while employing those managements, we’ll be very excited about doing so. It isn’t because we think that the shoe industry is any cinch, you know, per se, or anything of the sort, but we’ve got a lot of talent employed in the shoe business, and whenever we’ve got talent, we like to try and figure out a way to give them as big a domain as we can. And it’s not inconceivable that we would expand the shoe business, perhaps even significantly, over time. Zone four.
What are the prospects for the tobacco business?
[01:07:29] Shareholder (Stewart Hartman, Sioux City): Yeah, thanks, Mr. Buffett. My name is Stewart Hartman from Sioux City. After the brevity of the last question from section 4, I’ll try to be extremely brief. The… given the scrutiny that the tobacco business is going under right now, number one, what do you see as the business prospects for those huge cash cows? And at any point, would that be attractive to you, given their liability questions about the future?



How does Berkshire judge the usefulness of a product?
[01:08:59] Shareholder (Harriet Morton, Seattle, Washington): I’m Harriet Morton from Seattle, Washington. I’m wondering, when you are considering an acquisition, how you look at the usefulness of the product, in looking at any business.

But I think it’s hard to argue with the market on that. I mean, people… some people may think that, you know, listening to a rock concert is not something of high utility, other people may think it’s terrific. So we would judge that… I don’t think we would come to an independent decision that there was some great utility residing in some product that had been available to the public for a long time, but the public had not endorsed in any way. Charlie?




Did the Los Angeles earthquake hurt the super cat business?
[01:11:58] Shareholder (Chris Blunt, Omaha): Good morning, Mr. Berkshire… Buffett. I have a niece here who has a son named Berkshire. So, I’m Chris Blunt from Omaha. My first question is, in years past we’ve had samples of various products. When are we going to have some Guinness, some… somewhat now, Guinness samples? My second question is, in light of the multiple disasters that have taken place in LA, has that had any impact on the caps for Berkshire, on our super cat business?

Now, our total premiums this year might be, say, $250 million or something in that area. So one super cat in the wrong place would be… would produce, and there could be more than one, could produce, we’ll say, a $400 million, thereabouts, underwriting loss from that business. The LA quake is peanuts on that scale. But it wouldn’t have taken a whole lot more in terms of numbers on the Richter scale, if it happened to have an epicenter where it did and B, of the type that it was, relatively shallow, that we could have had that sort of thing happen.
I think that the insurance industry has vastly underestimated, maybe, maybe not, maybe not now, but up till a few years ago, the full potential of what is… what a super cat could do. But Hurricane Andrew and the LA quake may have been something of a wake-up call. They were far from a worst-case situation. A really big type 5 hurricane on Long Island would end up leaving a lot of very major insurance companies in significant trouble. We define our losses. Essentially, $700 million sounds like a lot of money, there’s a lot of money, but there are limits on our policies. That is not true of people that are just writing the basic homeowners or business. They… those losses could go off the chart.
There were certain companies in the LA quake that thought they had a… what they call a probable maximum loss for California quakes in it, and the LA quake, which was far from the worst case you can imagine, turned out to far exceed those probable maximum losses. So I think the industry has had, and may still have, its head in the sand a little bit in terms of what can happen, either in terms of a quake in California or, more probably, in terms of a hurricane along the East Coast.
So far this year we’re in reasonable shape, but that doesn’t mean much because by far the larger exposure is in hurricanes. And essentially 50% of the hurricanes hit in September, and about, I think it’s about 15% would be in August, close to 15% in October. So you have 80% roughly in those three months, and there’s a little tail on both sides. But that’s when you find out whether you’ve had a good or bad year in the super cat business. Basically, it’s a business we like at the right rates, because there are very few people can afford to write it at the level that the underlying company, the reinsured companies, need it. And we are in a position, if the rates are right, to do significant business. Charlie?

What books did they like, and why keep investing simple?
TL;DR: Buffett named Janet Lowe’s Ben Graham biography and Munger named Van Doren’s Benjamin Franklin. Both said they avoid hard problems and ignore sellers’ projections.

What were the best books they read last year?
[01:17:12] Shareholder (Clayton Reilly, Jacksonville, Florida): Clayton Reilly from Jacksonville, Florida. This is a little different than all the other questions, but what were the three best books you read last year outside of the investment field?

One of the books I enjoyed a lot was written also by a shareholder who’s not here because he’s being sworn in, I believe, today or tomorrow, maybe tomorrow, as head of the Voice of America. And that’s Geoff Cowan’s book, which is on The People versus Clarence Darrow. It’s the story of the Clarence Darrow trial for essentially a jury bribery in Los Angeles back around 1912, when the McNamara brothers had bombed the LA Times. And it’s a fascinating book. Geoff uncovered a lot of information that the previous biographies of Darrow didn’t have. I think you’d enjoy that. Charlie?






What are the long-term risks for Nike and Reebok?
[01:20:02] Shareholder (Mike Assael, New York City): Thank you for teaching me, teaching so much to all of us about business. My name is Mike Assael from New York City. You mentioned earlier that Berkshire’s shoe business was great but that other shoe businesses were not so good. What are the uncertainties of the global brand leaders? That the Berkshire seems to like, they like Coke and Gillette. The global brand leaders in the shoe business being a Nike and Reebok, what are their uncertainties in terms of long-term competitive advantage, business economics, consumer behavior and the other risk factors that you mentioned in the annual report this year? Thank you.

[01:20:55] Shareholder (Mike Assael, New York City): Yeah.

Some businesses are a lot easier to understand than others, and Charlie and I don’t like difficult problems. I mean, we… if something is hard to figure, you know, I mean, we’d rather multiply by three than by pi. I mean, it’s just easier for us. Charlie, I mean…


And similarly, if you get into some complicated business, you can get a report that’s a thousand pages thick and you got PhDs working on it, but it doesn’t mean anything. You know, what you’ve got is a report, but you don’t… it… you won’t understand that business, what it’s going to look like in 10 or 15 years.




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What will happen with USAir and its costs?
[01:26:08] Shareholder (Greg Ulrich, Washington, D.C.): Mr. Buffett, Greg Ulrich from Washington, D.C. In the last year, United Airlines and Northwest have resolved some of their financial problems by moving ownership over to the employees. With USAir’s current positions, problems, what do you see as occurring with USAir, and do you see any movement toward employee ownership, and how will that affect Berkshire’s interest in the company?



What do Buffett and Munger think about the market and global investing?
TL;DR: Munger said he prefers a retirement nobody can see. Buffett said they never have an opinion on the market and would welcome lower prices.
What are Charlie Munger’s retirement plans?
[01:29:37] Shareholder (Sheldon Zuzuk, Chicago, Illinois): My name is Sheldon Zuzuk from Chicago, Illinois. I have two questions. The first one is concerning Mr. Munger. We know what Mr. Buffett’s retirement plans ours are. I was wondering what yours… your plans for the future concerning Berkshire.


[01:30:46] Shareholder (Sheldon Zuzuk, Chicago, Illinois): Thank you. My second question is, I was just curious why you sold a portion of Cap Cities.

How is the structured settlement business doing?
[01:32:10] Shareholder (Matt Volk, Omaha): Good morning. My name is Matt Volk. I’m from Omaha. Last year’s meeting, you made reference to structured settlements. I was wondering how is that business progressing for you?

Has Berkshire looked at Wrigley?
[01:33:23] Shareholder (David Samra, San Francisco, California): My name is David Samra. I’m from San Francisco, California. And in your inner report, I noticed you mentioned Wrigley as being a company that has worldwide dominance, somewhat like Coca-Cola and Gillette, and was curious to know if you had looked at the company in any detail, and if so, whether or not, if you decided not to invest, what were the reasons why?



How does Berkshire think about global diversification?
[01:34:47] Shareholder (Kathleen Ambrose, Omaha): Mr. Buffett, Kathleen Ambrose from Omaha. I have a question regarding global diversification. Just in general, what do you look for in a company, and if so, as far as Europe or Latin America, if you’d like to be specific?

Certainly, in many cases, there are markets outside the United States that have way better prospects for growth than the U.S. market would have, but they probably have some other risks to them that this market may not have. But we, you know, we like the international prospects, obviously, a company like Coke. We like the international prospects of a company like Gillette, joe, that earned 70% of its money outside this country. So if you look on a look-through basis, Coke, we might this year get something like $150 million of earnings indirectly for Berkshire’s interest from the rest of the world just through Coca-Cola alone. But we don’t make any specific… we don’t think in terms of, I like this region so I want to be there, or something of a sort. That, it… it’s something that’s specific to the companies we’re looking at, and then we’ll try to evaluate that.
Coke is expanding in China. Well, at the… you know, that I think, I forget what they showed last year, maybe 38% growth or something like that in cases. Maybe, it’s nice to have markets like that, that are really relatively untapped. Actually, Gillette is expanding in China in a big way, and the Chinese don’t shave as often, and then more of them are what they call dry shavers, and wet shavers, they’re… which is electric shavers. But, you know, maybe we could stick something into Coke that would come… maybe a little synergy at Berkshire finally, who knows. Zone 1.
How do riots compare to natural disasters for insurers?
[01:37:42] Shareholder (Marshall Patton, Bandera, Texas): Good morning. I’m Marshall Patton from Bandera, Texas. And back to the insurance losses, what is the comparison between natural disasters, and such as the earthquake and so on, and the LA riots?

But you get interesting questions on this. You’re the… usually we ensure an event, but what’s an event? If you go back to the riots that occurred after Martin Luther King was shot, he had riots in dozens of cities. Is that one event, or is that a multiple number of events? I mean, they’re distorted by different people, and, but maybe arising from a common cause. Some of those things aren’t actually very well defined even after hundreds of years of insurance law and custom, experience of that. And… but I would say that rioting is very, very unlikely to get to a level that triggers our policy. The big risks we face are quake and hurricanes, and hurricanes are more significant risk than quake. They call them typhoons in the Pacific Ocean. But floods, tremendous damage from floods last year, but basically there’s not a lot of private flood insurance bought, so the insured losses do not get to… not get large. Just watch the Weather Channel. Zone 2.
Are Buffett and Munger bullish or bearish?
[01:40:19] Shareholder (Diane West, Corona del Mar, California): Diane West from Corona del Mar, California. I know, Mr. Buffett, that you’ve said that you don’t read what other people say about the market or the economy, but do either you or Charlie have an opinion about how you think things are going to go? Are you bullish or bearish?

I mean, I bought my first stock, I think, in probably April of 1942, when I was 11. And since then, I mean, actually World War II didn’t look so good at that time. I mean, the prospects, they really didn’t. I mean, you know, we were not doing well on the Pacific, and I’m not sure I calculated that into my purchase of my three shares. But they… I mean, just think of all the things that have happened since then. You know, atomic weapons and major wars and presidents resigning and all kinds of things, massive inflation at certain times. To give up what you’re doing well to because of guesses about what’s going to happen in some macro way just doesn’t make any sense to us.
The best thing that can happen from Berkshire’s standpoint, we don’t wish this on anybody, but is it an overtime, is to have markets that go down a tremendous amount. We are going to be buyers of things over time. If you’re going to be buyers of groceries over time, you like grocery prices to go down. If you’re going to be buying cars over time, you like car prices to go down. We buy businesses, we buy pieces of businesses, stocks, and we’re going to be much better off if we can buy those things at an attractive price than if we can’t. So we don’t have any fear at all. I mean, what we fear is an irrational bull market that’s sustained for some long period of time.
You, as shareholders of Berkshire, unless you own your shares on borrowed money or are going to sell them in a very short period of time, are better off if stocks get cheaper, because it means that we can be doing more intelligent things on your behalf than it would be the case otherwise. So I… but we have no idea what… and we wouldn’t care what anybody thought about it. I mean, it… most of all ourselves. Charlie?




How do Buffett and Munger think about buying businesses, risk and taxes?
TL;DR: Buffett said the stock market offers better prices than negotiated deals. He defined risk as the chance of harm over your holding period.
Are private businesses better buys than public stocks?
[01:44:53] Shareholder (Tim Medley, Jackson, Mississippi): Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, last year… I’m Tim Medley from Jackson, Mississippi. Last year the question was asked about your preference for purchasing entire businesses versus parts of public companies. You mentioned you prefer to buy private businesses because of the tax advantages and your attraction to the people in those businesses. Are you finding today that there are better purchases within the private market versus in the public securities markets?

Counter to that is, we can usually get more for our money in wonderful businesses in terms of buying little pieces of them in the market, because the market is far more inefficient in pricing businesses than is… it is the negotiated market. You’re not going to buy any bargains, and, I mean, you shouldn’t even approach the idea of buying a bargain and a negotiated purchase. You want to buy it from people are going to run it for you. They want to buy it… from people who are intelligent enough to price their business properly, and they are. I mean, that’s the way things are. The market does not do that. The market, in the stock market, you get a chance to buy businesses at foolish prices, and that is why we end up with a lot of money in marketable securities.
If we absolutely had our choice, we would own a group of… we would own three times the number of businesses we own outright. We’re unlikely to get that opportunity over time, but periodically we’ll get the chance to find something that fits our tests, and in between we will, when the market officers the right prices, we will buy more, either businesses we already own pieces of, or we’ll buy one or two new ones. Something’s usually going on. There are tax advantages to owning all of them, but that’s more than offset by the fact that you’ll never get a chance to buy the co… you never get a chance to buy the whole Coca-Cola Company or the whole Gillette company. Businesses like that, the sensational businesses, are just not available. Sometimes you get a chance to make a sensible purchase in the market of such businesses. Charlie?


In terms of buying securities, most managers don’t even think about it. It’s very interesting to me, because they’ll say that they’ll have somebody else manage their money in terms of a portfolio of securities. Well, all that is is a portfolio businesses. And I’ll say, “Well, why don’t you pick out your own portfolio?” Let’s say, “That’s much too difficult.” And then some guy will come along with some business that they never heard of a week before and give him some figures and a few projections, and the guy thinks he knows enough to buy that business. That very puzzling to me sometimes. Zone 4. Could you hold a little closer to you? I can’t hear too well.
How does Berkshire’s price compare to its intrinsic value?
[01:50:40] Shareholder (Dan Rader, San Mateo, California): It’s hard to hear. Is the mic on there?

[01:50:52] Shareholder (Dan Rader, San Mateo, California): Let’s try it one more time. Dan Rader, San Mateo, California. This is a question for Mr. Munger. In your most recent letter to shareholders in Wesco’s annual report, you calculated the intrinsic value of Wesco at about $100 per share and compared that to the then current market price of Wesco of about $130 per share. In the same letter, you stated that it was unclear whether then current market prices Berkshire or Wesco presented a better value to prospective purchasers. In light of that, would you compare the intrinsic value of Berkshire to its current market price?


And it’s… Charlie, we basically, we don’t want to disappoint people. We also don’t want to disappoint ourselves. But we have our own yardsticks for what we think is doable. We try to convey that as well as we can to the people who are partners in the business. And I think that we saw some things being published about Wesco that simply would… what might have led to, probably did lead to some expectations that simply weren’t consonant with our own personal expectations, and that’s… that leaves us uncomfortable. Zone 5.
How does Berkshire’s view of risk differ?
[01:54:29] Shareholder (Charles Pyle, Ann Arbor, Michigan): Hello, my name is Charles Pyle from Ann Arbor, Michigan. I’d like to ask you to expound on your view of risk in the financial world, and I asked that against the background of what appear to be a number of inconsistencies between your view of risk and the conventional view of risk. I mentioned that in a recent article you pointed out an inconsistency in the use of beta as a measure of risk, which is a common standard. And I mentioned that derivatives are dangerous, and yet you feel comfortable playing in derivatives through Salomon Brothers. And betting on hurricanes is dangerous, and yet you feel comfortable playing with hurricanes through insurance companies. So it appears that you have some view of risk that’s inconsistent with what would appear on the face of it to be the conventional view of risk.

Now, as I pointed out the annual report, it became very fashionable in the academic world, and then that spilled over into the financial markets, to define risk in terms of volatility, of which beta became a measure. But that measure, that isn’t… that is no measure of risk. Does the risk, in terms of our her… in terms of our super cat business, is not that we lose money in any given year. We know we’re going to lose money in some given day. That is for certain. And we’re extremely likely to lose money in a given year. Our time horizon of writing that business, you know, would be at least a decade, and we think the probability of losing money over a decade is low. So we feel that, in terms of our horizon of investment, that is not a risky business, and it’s a whole lot less risky than writing something that’s much more predictable.
Interesting thing is that, using conventional measures of risk, something whose return varies from year to year between plus 20% and plus 80% is riskier, as defined, and something whose return is 5% a year every year. We just think the financial world has gone haywire in terms of measures of risk. We look at what we do. We are perfectly willing to lose money on a given transaction, arbitrage being an example, any given insurance policy being another example. We are perfectly willing to lose money on any given transaction. We are not willing to enter into transactions in which we think the probability of doing a number of mutually independent events of us, but of a similar type, has an expectancy of loss. And we hope that we are entering into our transactions where our calculations of those probabilities have validity. And to do so, we try to narrow it down. There are a whole bunch of things we just won’t do, because we don’t think we can write the equation on them.
But we basically, Charlie and I, by nature are pretty risk-averse, but we are very willing to enter into transactions. We… if we knew it was an honest coin and someone wanted to give us 7 to 5 or something of the sort on one flip, how much of Berkshire’s net worth would we put on that flip? Well, we wouldn’t… it would sound like a big number to you. It would not be a huge percentage of the net worth, but it would be a significant number. We will do things with probabilities favor us. Charlie?


Does Buffett favor higher personal tax rates?
[01:59:45] Shareholder (Paul Miller, Kansas City, Missouri): Good morning. I’m Paul Miller from Kansas City, Missouri. I’ve got two questions. First, not too long ago, I believe it was Fortune magazine that ran an article regarding personal tax rates, and at the risk of misquoting you, my recollection is that you favored higher personal rates, rates even higher than those proposed by those in Washington. The second question is, I’ve heard Berkshire Hathaway referred to as nothing more than a high-priced rich man’s mutual fund. Would you care to comment on that also?



The question about Berkshire being a… I think it was a rich man mutual fund or something. We don’t look at it that way at all. We look at it as a collection of businesses, and ideally we would own all of those businesses. So it’s… to the extent that a mutual fund owns stock in a lot of companies and diversifies among businesses, and we try to own a lot of businesses ourselves, I guess that’s true. But I guess you could say the same thing of General Electric or an operation like that. We are more prone to buy pieces of businesses than the typical manager, but we are trying to do, in a sense, the same thing Jack Welch is trying to do with General Electric, which is trying to own a number of first-class businesses. He gets to put the imprint of his own management, which I think is very good, on those businesses. And we are more hands-off, both in the businesses we own outright and in the ones we own pieces of, but we’re going at it the same way. And the General Electric has been very successful under Jack’s leadership and doing it his way. We think, in terms of what we bring to the game and the problems of putting money to work all the time, that our own system is, you know, will work best for us. Charlie?

How do interest rates, cash and reinsurance fit Berkshire’s approach?
TL;DR: Buffett said every asset is 100% sensitive to interest rates. He called idle cash an index of failure and closed the official meeting after Sandy Gottesman’s tribute.

How do interest rates affect Berkshire’s holdings?
[02:04:19] Shareholder (Christopher Davis, New York City): Hello, I’m Christopher Davis from New York City. I’m interested in that many of the holdings of Berkshire are in industries that are perceived as interest rate sensitive industries, including Wells Fargo, Salomon, Freddie Mac, even GEICO. And yet you have an admitted sort of ambivalence towards interest rates or changes in interest rates, and it therefore seems that you don’t feel that those changes affect the fundamental attractiveness of those businesses. I thought maybe you could share your thoughts on what you see in these businesses that the investment community as a whole is ignoring.

Now, the question as to whether a Wells Fargo or a Freddie Mac or whatever it may be, whether their business gets better or worse internally, as opposed to the valuation process, because of higher interest rates, that is not easy to figure. I mean, GEICO, if they write their insurance business at the same underwriting ratio, in other words they have the same loss and expensive experience relative to premiums, they benefit by higher interest rates, obviously, over time, because they’re a float business and the float is worth more to them. Now, externally, getting back to the valuation part, the present value of those earnings also becomes less than… but the present value of Coke’s earnings becomes less in a higher interest rate environment. Wells Fargo, it’s… whether they earn more or less money under any given interest rate scenario is hard to figure. There may be one short-term effect and there may be another long-term effect. So I do not have to have a view on interest rates, and I don’t have a view on interest rates, to make a decision as to an insurance business or a mortgage guarantor business or a banking business or something of sort, relative to making a judgment about Coke or Gillette. Charlie?


What about retroactive policies and Bermuda reinsurers?
[02:07:20] Shareholder (Benjamin Baron, New York): Hello, I’m Benjamin Baron from New York. Um, could you speak about your insurance business a little bit, and especially the retroactive policies you’ve been writing?

[02:07:40] Shareholder (Benjamin Baron, New York): Reinsurance and the retroactive, and also the market in Bermuda and how you see it, it’s one of your potential markets.

[02:08:28] Shareholder (Benjamin Baron, New York): Pardon me. Did you get comment on the development of the insurance business in Bermuda?

Reinsurance business by its nature will be a business in which some very stupid things are done, and mass, periodically. I mean, it… that you can be doing dumb things and not know it in reinsurance, and then all of a sudden wake up and find out the, you know, the money is gone. And it’s the… it’s what people have found out, and I use that line in the report a year ago, it’s what people have found out that were speculating on bonds with low margins recently, that, you know, you don’t find out who’s been swimming naked until the tide goes out. And essentially that’s what happens in reinsurance. You don’t… you really don’t find out who’s been swimming naked till the wind blows something. Zone 3.
Does Berkshire hold more cash in uncertain times?
[02:10:46] Shareholder: And my question is, right now we are reading about various analysts and how you should, in their individual opinion, adjust your… more cash, more stocks, more bonds, because of… How does Berkshire Hathaway feel about times of relative financial insecurity? Do you arrange for more cash reserves, looking forward to a time when you might be able to buy, or do you go along your path?

I think I would have to admit that if we have a lot of money around, we are a little dumber than usual. I mean, it tends to make you careless. But, and I would say that the best purchases are usually made when you have to sell something to raise the money to get them, because it just raises the bar a little bit that you jump over in the mental decisions. But we have, I don’t know what we’ll show, but, um, certainly well over $1 billion of cash around, and that’s not through choice. That is a… that you can look at that as an index of failure on the part of your management, and we will be happy when we can buy businesses or small pieces of businesses that use up that money. Zone 4.
Will Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac gain market share?
[02:13:36] Shareholder (Richard Sercer, Tucson, Arizona): Gentlemen, my name is Richard Sercer from Tucson, Arizona. I understand that 40% of all home mortgages have been securitized by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the duopoly. I would, at the risk of asking you for a projection, since you talked about projections before, I’d be interested in understanding what you think will happen to that market share over time for this duopoly. Thank you.

We had a business that intermediated money, went out, got it from depositors and lent it to people who want to borrow on a home. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae do it the same way. They don’t do exactly the same way, but they perform the same function, and they did it… they could do it so much more cheaply than we could do it by having branches or anything of the sort, and paying the insurance fee we paid. They’re going to get the business. They should get the business. And so their market share will grow. Charlie?


Does faster information change how Berkshire decides?
[02:15:47] Shareholder (Sarah Pruitt, Milwaukee, Wisconsin): Good morning, I’m Sarah Pruitt from Milwaukee, Wisconsin. And I wondered if you feel that the speed with which information is available and disseminated today has affected your business buying decision process, and do you believe that speed has caused you to miss opportunities?

And I would say that, well, virtually everything we’ve done has been reading public reports, and then maybe asking questions around ascertain trade positions or product strengths or something of that sort. But we never have to… we can make decisions very fast. And when we get called on a business, or we can make up our mind whether we’re interested in two or three minutes. I mean, that takes no time. We may have to do a little checking on a few things subsequently, but we don’t need to get… I can’t think of anything where we really need lots of price data, things like that, extremely fast to make any decisions. We’ve got good management information systems in our operating businesses, but that’s just another, you know, that’s a question of keeping inventories where they should be and all of that sort of thing. I don’t think the investor… I think you could be in some place where the mails were delayed three weeks and the quotations were delayed three weeks, and I think you could do just fine in investing. Zone 6.
Is Berkshire near intrinsic value, and why no buyback?
[02:18:37] Shareholder (James Pan, New York City): James Pan, New York City. I have a two-parter question. One, do you think the stock price of Berkshire Hathaway is trading within 15% of its intrinsic value currently? And two, if you think Berkshire Hathaway is undervalued, with the amount of cash you have on your balance sheet, would you consider a buyback?



Beware of people that give you a lot of numbers about their businesses, I mean, in terms of projections or valuations or that sort of thing. We try to give you all the numbers that we would use ourselves in making our own calculations of value. We really… if you read the Berkshire reports, you essentially, you have all the information that Charlie and I would use in making a decision about the security. And if there’s anything really lacking in that respect, you know, we would actually… we truly appreciate hearing from you, because we want to have that kind of information in the report. But then we want you to make the calculation. But we’ve stuck… I mean, that material, for example, on the float in the insurance business, we consider that quite relevant, obviously, because we use up almost a page printing it. Pretty serious stuff at Berkshire, the… But that is relevant. I mean, your interpretation may be different than the minor Charlie’s, but those are important numbers. And we could give you a lot of bologna about satisfied policyholders, you know, in Lincoln, Nebraska. I wouldn’t tell you a thing about what the company’s worth, and have pictures of them and happy, you know, receiving the check from the agent, all of that. But we’re not going to do that. Zone 1.
What does Buffett think of Peter Lynch?
[02:22:59] Shareholder (Mike Macy, Indianapolis): Mike Macy from Indianapolis. I have really enjoyed reading your annual letters and your annual report, and I’ve gone back and read all the older ones too. They’re terrific. I have also enjoyed reading the two books by Peter Lynch, and I see a lot of commonalities between the two of you, the way you think, your philosophy, etc. I’d certainly appreciate it if you’d make a few comments on what you think of Peter Lynch, the things he says in his two books and the advice that he gives to investors.

Why did primary insurance premiums jump in 1993?
[02:24:27] Shareholder (Dave Lancas, Business Insurance magazine): Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, my name is Dave Lancas. I’m a senior editor at Business Insurance magazine. A two-part question for you. Can you explain a little bit regarding your primary insurance operations, what drove up written premiums by more than 50% last year, and if you expect that to continue this year? And then, regarding your earlier comments on the stupid things reinsurers can do in moss, can you explain what potential pitfalls that the new cat facilities in Bermuda will have to avoid that you feel Berkshire Hathaway won’t fall into?

In the reinsurance business, I think essentially the difference in our reinsurance business from many others, you know, doesn’t include them all, in a place like Bermuda, is that is essentially the difference that may exist in our operations and securities versus other people. We will offer reinsurance at any time in very large quantities at prices we think make sense, but we won’t do business if we don’t think it makes sense. Just like we will buy securities to the extent of the cash we have available if they make sense, but we have no interest in being in the stock market per se just to be in it. We want to own securities that make sense to us.
I think for most managements, if the only thing they’re in is the reinsurance business, they may like it better when the, when prices make sense, but they will, I think they will be prone to do quite a bit of business when prices don’t make sense as well, because there’s no alternative except to give the money back to the owners, and that is not something that most managements, you know, do somersaults over. So I think we are in a favored position, essentially being, having the flexibility of capital allocation that lets us take the lack of business with a certain equanimity that most managements probably can’t because of their sole focus on the business.
Rates will get silly in all likelihood after a period when nothing much happens, when you’ve had a couple of years of good experience. We priced what we think is exposure. We don’t price to experience. I mean, the fact that there was no big hurricane last year, I forget the name of the one that was coming in at North Carolina and it veered out, essentially, but to us it has nothing to do with the rates next year whether that hurricane actually came in in a big way or veered out into the Atlantic again. I mean, we are pricing to exposure, and everyone says that, but the market tends to price and respond to experience, and generally to recent experience.
That’s why all the retrocessional operations in London, you know, in the spiral, went busted, because they priced, in our view, they priced to experience rather than to exposure. It’s very hard not to do that, to be there year after year with business coming by and investors expecting things of you, and not do that. But we will never knowingly do that. We may get influenced subconsciously in some way to do that, but we will not do that any more than we will accept stock market norms as being the proper way for us to invest money in equities, basically. And when you lay out money or accept insurance risks, you really have to think for yourself. Nobody, you cannot let the market think for you. Charlie?


[02:30:18] Shareholder (David Gottesman, New York): David Gottesman from New York. It’s no wonder that this meeting draws stockholders from all over the country, and despite the talk about age today, I’m happy to say this meeting gets better every year. Berkshire stands unique in American business as a company whose name has become synonymous with management excellence. Unlike many American corporations, we as stockholders don’t have to worry about reorganizations, large write-offs, massive restructurings, overstated earnings and overpaid executives with strategic visions. Instead, year in and year out, we enjoy the benefits of the common sense and brilliance of Charlie and Warren.

[02:31:21] Shareholder (David Gottesman, New York): I want to add to that, to say nothing of your good humor. It’s easy to take such consistently outstanding results for granted, but we in this room are the direct beneficiaries of their efforts. By our presence here today we show our appreciation to them for their exceptional performance, but we can also demonstrate it in another way. I would like to suggest we give them a rousing hand of applause for a job well done. Thank you.
What came up in the extra session after the official meeting?
TL;DR: In the informal hour Buffett talked about World Book, General Dynamics and Salomon pay. He said stop loss orders on Berkshire make no sense to him.


Does Buffett still feel the same about Guinness?
[02:32:38] Shareholder: You feel basically the same about your investment in Guinness now as when you made the investment, in terms of the company?

What is Berkshire doing about World Book’s sales?
[02:33:19] Shareholder (David Winters, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey): Hi, David Winters from Mountain Lakes, New Jersey. Just wondering, World Books had a tough time lately, and I’m wondering if there’s things you’re doing to try to improve that. And also the Buffalo News has been fabulous, and I’m kind of wondering what’s driving the Buffalo News.

[02:33:38] Shareholder (David Winters, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey): Yeah, well, it’s doing well, right?

But Encyclopedia Britannica, as you probably know, ran at a loss last year. The encyclopedia business has been very, has been poor. Could be due to electronic competition, could be due to recruiting problems for salespeople, obviously can be a combination of many factors. If we knew the answer, we’d have, you wouldn’t be seeing those figures right now. But it is a top item of attention for Ralph. He takes anything that’s not performing as well as before very seriously, and we will see what happens, but I don’t have a prediction on it. I wish I knew the answer. I don’t see any variables to, in any intelligent way, tell you, or we put in the report the best we could do on that.
The profitability, as, like I say, has been pretty good, but obviously current trends of new sales will catch up with us at some point unless we boost unit sales. I don’t think our market share, if you look at print encyclopedias, has fallen, but I can’t be sure of that, but I think that’s probably true. But there are an awful lot of encyclopedias going out there as part of a bundled product with computer sales. How are we going to do this? Is there, we got 3 now? Okay, I’ll let you hand the mic to who, whoever. Yeah, you.
Why not break Berkshire into smaller entities?
[02:36:16] Shareholder (Lee, Palo Alto): Lee again, from Palo Alto. By Omaha standards you are a relatively young man, and every year you point out that Berkshire size now precludes you from making the great relatively small trades which made your reputation. How much thought have you given to breaking up Berkshire into smaller entities?

[02:36:41] Shareholder (Lee, Palo Alto): How much thought have you given into breaking up Berkshire into smaller entities, which will allow you to make those nice small wonderful trades that you made from the beginning?



Why did Berkshire sell General Dynamics shares?
[02:38:53] Shareholder (Michael Bugander, New York City): Michael Bugander, New York City. Two questions. One, last year you discussed in your annual report your investment in General Dynamics, and you also gave your proxy to the company and its management. This year it appears you have sold the stock this year.

[02:39:10] Shareholder (Michael Bugander, New York City): This year it appears that you have sold the stock in General Dynamics. What has changed that you sold 20% of your stake? This is country number one, and I have number two.

[02:40:14] Shareholder (Michael Bugander, New York City): But should I take from this comment that you have changed your view about the business itself, part… Should I take from your comment that you have changed your view about the business itself?

[02:40:30] Shareholder (Michael Bugander, New York City): Okay. Question number two, could you…

Why was Berkshire’s stock more volatile in 1993?
[02:40:51] Shareholder: It appeared to me that in 1993 the variation between the stock price for the high and the low was much greater in years than years in the past. Would you mind commenting on that?

We, our best way to handle that is to give all the information we can to shareholders and prospective shareholders, and follow policies that we think will induce the investment-oriented with long time horizons to join us, and not to encourage other people. But occasionally, you know, we can’t guarantee that result. One of the things was interesting to me, I don’t know whether it was three months ago or when, but I happened to be talking to the specialist, terrific specialist, Jimmy Maguire. He had to leave, but he was here earlier in the session. And I think at the time the stock was around 16,000 or something like that, and he had some rather significant stop loss orders on the books at 15,500 or thereabouts, involving some hundreds of shares. To me, it is a signal that, you know, we have some people that are, in my view, are not really the kind of owners that we would like to attract, because why somebody wants to put an order to sell something for 15,500 that they don’t wanna sell at 16,000 is beyond me. But, and the idea of people using stop loss orders with Berkshire obviously tells me that we’ve got some people in that that are using it as a trading vehicle of some sort, or have some totally non-investment type calculations in their mind.
I don’t think we have very many of them, but obviously if you have enough people like that, you will have a more volatile stock than if you have a whole bunch of people who look at it as something that they’re going to hold for the rest of their life. And the stock did go down at that time and hit 15,500, and there was that, I think it was close to 300 shares, which is $4.5 million worth of stock, and somebody made a decision apparently that they, or some small number of people, made a decision that they wanted to sell something at 15,500 that they could have sold for 16,000. The lower it went, the better they liked it, apparently. I mean, the better they like the sale. Which, you know, has always struck me as like having a house that you like and you’re living in, and you know it’s worth $100,000, and you tell your broker, you know, if anybody ever comes along and offers 90, you want to sell it. I mean, it doesn’t make any sense.
But it has, I would say that there’s been some small, I think relatively small, tendency for people to get, a relatively few people, but to get more interested in the price of the stock than in terms, and thinking of it in terms of whether it’s going to go up or down in the next six months, than might formerly been in the case. I think we’re unusually well blessed in that respect, in that, and that we’ve got people who basically want owned for a very long time. But to the extent that you get people who were owning it because they think the stock market’s going to go up, or something of that sort is going to happen, that is not good news from our standpoint, and it will increase the volatility in it. We will do nothing to encourage that. Zone 2.
Where does the cash come from when markets fall?
[02:44:38] Shareholder (Steve Lang, Toronto): Yes, Mr. Buffett, Steve Lang from Toronto. I was just curious about when you were saying that one of the best things that could happen to shareholders is the market goes down and you’re able to buy good businesses at foolish prices. And then a little later on you were saying that we could judge your ability to do what it is that you feel you should be doing by how much cash you have in the account at any given point in time, and by what, by the amount of cash that you have in the account. In other words, I guess what you feel you’re supposed to be doing is investing the cash in good businesses. So I’m just wondering about that kind of dichotomy. Where does the cash come from if the market does go down, if you’ve been successful in your first ability? Would that be from the cash flow on the operations of the business, from the float? Is that so? So really the success of the company then is to some degree the fact that you’re able to dollar cost average into the market on an ongoing basis, is that right?

But to the extent that we have net cash coming in, which we do and which we will have, on balance we are, you know, we are adding to our businesses at more attractive prices than would be the other case. And it’s no prediction on any given company. I mean, whether it’s Gillette or Coke, or it might be something we already own, it might be something we don’t own, but we welcome the chance to buy more shares. We’re not wishing it on anybody, but if you asked us next month whether Berkshire would be better off if the whole stock market were down 50% or where it is now, we would be better off it was down 50%, whether we had any cash on hand now or not, because we would be generating cash to buy things. Zone 3.
Would better pay have helped Salomon earlier?
[02:47:00] Shareholder (Byron Ransdell, Raleigh, North Carolina): Byron Ransdell from Raleigh, North Carolina. Thanks for your hospitality this weekend.

[02:47:10] Shareholder (Byron Ransdell, Raleigh, North Carolina): My question concerns Salomon Inc, and more specifically Salomon Brothers. I know that you on the board of directors, I think from ’87 to the current time, very much interested in compensation, then maybe on the compensation committee. Between 1987 and 1992, Salomon’s financial results dismal, in a very lumpy way, but overall quite disabled. In your opinion, if the compensation had been rational during this time, would Salomon have shown results that would make it a quite decent business? Which I’m going to wonder if the conversation, if the past compensation had been more irrational, decisions had been more rational, ’87 to the current time, would Salomon have done better?

[02:48:04] Shareholder (Byron Ransdell, Raleigh, North Carolina): Yes, sir.

Does Berkshire still sell puts on stocks it wants?
[02:49:10] Shareholder: Oh boy. And I have one question. Last year you were using Coca-Cola puts as a way to increase income and, conversely, if they were exercised, as a way of increasing your position. Do you still use puts in this type on investments you wish to add to?

But we’re better off, probably, if we like something old enough to write a put on it, we’re probably better off buying the security itself. And particularly since we can’t do it in the kind of quantities that really would make it meaningful to Berkshire. There are securities I would not mind writing puts for 10 million shares or something, but that probably, it’s probably allowable for us to do it, it’s not allow, we probably have to do it through multiple brokers to get the job done. And on balance, I don’t think it’s as useful a way to spend my time as just looking for securities to buy outright. Charlie?

How large should one position be, and should Berkshire hedge currencies?
TL;DR: Buffett said he once had about 40% in a single stock. He said Berkshire does not hedge currencies because its view on currencies is no better than the market’s.
Did Berkshire buy Philip Morris and UST?
[02:51:23] Shareholder (Rogers, West Point): I’m from West Point. My name is Rogers. A couple of months ago there were stories in the World-Herald that Berkshire Hathaway had taken a large position in Philip Morris and UST, but in your annual report I don’t see anything about that. Can you comment?

And it’s interesting, because, you know, they keep getting printed, and frankly, from our standpoint, the fact that most of them are inaccurate is probably useful to us. We don’t do anything to encourage it, but it, the fact that people are reading that we are buying ABC or XYZ when we aren’t, you know, that’s, I don’t think people should be buying stocks because they’re reading in the paper that we’re buying something. But if they do, they may get cured of it at some point. Maybe the newspapers will even get cured of writing the stories when they don’t know what, you know, what the facts are. But it’s something we’ll, we live with, and we’ll probably continue to live with. And I would say that, based on history, if you read something about us buying or selling something other than through reports we filed with the SEC or regulatory bodies, the chances are well over 50% that, I can tell you, based on history, is correct, well over 50% that it’s wrong. Zone 3.
Will Berkshire join the Standard and Poor’s 500?
[02:53:45] Shareholder: Do you expect that Berkshire would become one of the Standard and Poor 500 stocks or Dow Jones stock?

I’ve always thought it’d be very interesting, for those of you who like to think about such things, that if we were part of the S P 500, and enough people became indexed so that 60% of the market was indexed, and if Charlie and I wouldn’t sell, which we wouldn’t, it’d be an interesting proposition as to how the index funds would ever get there, 60%, if they tried to replicate the S P. It’d be, I don’t know whether they have rules even about concentration of ownership. That same line of thing you might have applied to Walmart or some company, because just take the extreme example of a company that had 90% of its stock owned by one individual, and 12% of the money in the market were indexed, and the 90% wouldn’t sell, it would bring back the Northern Pacific corner or something of the assortment. In any event, I don’t think that’s going to be a problem, and I don’t think we are going to end up being in either index. Yeah, zone 1.
How large should a single position be?
[02:55:29] Shareholder (Aaron Morris, California): Mr. Buffett, my name is Aaron Morris. I’m from California. What I wanted to know was how you think about how large a position you’re willing to take in a given security, both in your case, where you have new cash coming in that you can invest, and in the case of an investor where they have a fixed amount of capital and they’re trying to decide what’s the most they should put in the security that they really love.





We only advise you to do that, probably don’t advise you do it at all, maybe, but we would only advise you to do it if you’re doing it based on your own conclusions about your own ideas of value, and something that you really feel you know enough to buy the whole business, if your funds were sufficient, that was being offered. You ought to really understand the business. But people do that all the time, incidentally, in private businesses, which have got terrible prosperity, by dry cleaning establishments or filling stations or whatever, and they put very hyper franchises of some kind. They put a very high percentage of their net worth into something, a business is very risky, basically. I mean, it, they, people put all their money in a farm, you know. It’s a business, it’s subject to all kinds of business risks. So it’s, it’s not crazy, if you understand the business well and if the price is sufficiently attractive, to put a very significant percentage of your net worth in. If you don’t understand businesses, then you’re better off diversifying, and fairly widely diversifying.


Where will Coca-Cola’s growth come from?
[02:59:20] Shareholder (Chuck Peterson, Omaha): Mr. Buffett, this is Chuck Peterson from Omaha, and I was just wondering if you could comment on the Coca-Cola Company. Haven’t really talked about it too much today, in regards to what you foresee over the next five years, the earnings per share growth, and where this growth is perhaps going to come from.

Were the LYONs a good deal for Berkshire?
[03:00:53] Shareholder (David Schwab, Austin, Texas): I’m sorry. David Schwab from Austin, Texas. I have a question pertaining to the convertible bonds that were outstanding for about four years. Any thoughts on, if you’re a teacher, to grade if that was a good deal, bad deal, how the money was employed compared to the cost of getting out of the bonds? Any thoughts?



How does Berkshire handle market impact when it sells?
[03:03:00] Shareholder (Joe Cerdovan, Toronto): Mr. Buffett, I’m Joe Cerdovan from Toronto. With respect to Berkshire’s non-permanent but large and therefore illiquid holdings, what is your strategy for managing market impact on sales, given the intense scrutiny that Berkshire is under by the market?

[03:03:35] Shareholder (Joe Cerdovan, Toronto): Okay, sorry. Just with respect to Berkshire’s large non-permanent holdings that are therefore liquid, I’m just wondering what your strategy is for managing market impact when you do decide to sell portions of those holdings, given the intense scrutiny you’re under.

Does Berkshire have key man insurance on Buffett and Munger?
[03:04:48] Shareholder (Anes Ripley, Roller, Virginia): My name is Anes Ripley. I’m from Roller, Virginia. Does Berkshire Hathaway or any of its subsidiaries have keyman insurance on you and Mr. Munger?

Will Berkshire hedge the currency risk in Guinness?
[03:05:46] Shareholder (Barry Ziskin, Mesa, Arizona): Mr. Buffett, I’m Barry Ziskin from Mesa, Arizona. Long time admirer. Viewers question pertains to Guinness. I remember reading in a publication I greatly respect, Outstanding Investor Digest, by Henry Emerson, New York, that back in, I think it was ’58 or ’59, you made an investment in Cuba, decided never to make an investment outside the United States again at that time. Have subsequently invested in Guinness. I’m a fellow investor and Guinness, have invested in Guinness for, and its sister company Louis Vuitton Moët Hennessy, for over five years, and I’m very happy with those investments, by the way.
There’s been a restructuring, as you know, of the Guinness LVMH relationship, where Guinness no longer owns 24% of LVMH, rather it owns only its distilling, or I should say alcoholic beverage relation, right, the Moët Hennessy part. The other parts of LVMH are showing better results these days, namely the Louis Vuitton luggage as well as the Christian Dior perfume. They’ve also expanded into the newspaper business this past year, a business that you understand. Do you intend to look at the possibility, first of all, of participating in those businesses that you no longer own now with the restructured Guinness LVMH deal through some other form?
And the second question relates to the currency risk inherent in the Guinness investment, I’m having bought it at about 1.80, as you mentioned, pound sterling now down to about a dollar 48. The cost of hedging foreign currency through the FX has diminished, through the combination of lower interest rates in the UK and the higher interest rates most recently in the US, to just about zero. I take it we’re all investors in companies, not speculators in currencies. So the second part of the question is, do you intend to do anything about the currency risk portion of that investment?

Second question, related to hedging. Yeah, they had to encourage the edge. The answer to that is we don’t. And Coca-Cola, as I mentioned, gets 80% the earnings from a variety of currencies, the yen and the mark being two very important ones. They’re going to be getting a very high percentage five years from now, 10 years from now. They do certain currency transactions, but it’s a practical matter, if you own Coca-Cola, you own a bunch of foreign bonds with coupons on them, denominated in local currencies, that go on forever. Now, should you try and engage in currency swaps on all those coupons? You don’t know what those coupons are yet, because you don’t know how much they’re going to earn in Japan or Germany, but you do know it’s going to go on for decades, and they’re going to be very significant sums.
Should you try and engage in a whole bunch of currency swaps to go on out and convert all that stream into dollars? We basically don’t think it’s worth it. We don’t think our opinion on currencies is any good. We don’t think, we think the market probably know, well, we know it knows as much about it, probably knows more about currencies. But we don’t know, we do not know more than the market does about currency. So there are costs to hedging, and even though interest rate structures may cause the curve to look flat going out forward, so that in effect there’s no contango on it, it’s still, there’s still the cost, there are costs in it. Now, it’s a relatively efficient market, so that they’re not huge, but we see no reason to incur those costs with what we regard as a totally a 50-50 proposition.
And it really doesn’t go out that far anyway. I mean, we could do it for a couple of years, but if you take that, the way we look at businesses being the discounted flow of future cash out between now and judgment day, we can’t really hedge that kind of a risk anyway. We could keep rolling hedges, but there’s a cost to it that we don’t want to incur. We don’t, we wouldn’t worry a whole lot about whether some portion of our earnings, whether it’s from Guinness, whether it’s from Coke, whether it’s from Gillette, are denominated at some mixture of marks and pounds and yen and dollars, or whether they’re all in dollars. We’d slightly prefer it we’re all in dollars, but we don’t lose sleep over the fact that it may be coming from a mix of currencies like that. We wouldn’t like it in terms of, obviously, some very weak currencies. Zone 1.
How do Buffett and Munger estimate intrinsic value?
TL;DR: Buffett said value is the discounted cash a business will produce. A business that grows without needing capital is worth far more.
Is the insurance excess value larger in dollars or percent?
[03:11:50] Shareholder (Lawrence Graham, Mill Valley, California): Lawrence Graham in Mill Valley, California. On page 13 of the annual report, in talking about the insurance operation, you say that it possesses an intrinsic value that exceeds its book value by a large amount, larger, in fact, than is the case in any other Berkshire business. To refine an earlier question that was asked, could you tell me whether you mean that it is larger in, by a percentage or an absolute dollars?

[03:12:22] Shareholder (Lawrence Graham, Mill Valley, California): And that’s what you’re referring to by…


Does the Coca-Cola succession concern Buffett?
[03:13:06] Shareholder (Joe Little, Vancouver, Canada): Joe Little, Vancouver, Canada. Does the management succession issue for the top job at Coca-Cola concern you?

[03:13:21] Shareholder (Joe Little, Vancouver, Canada): The management succession issue over the next several years.



How is the Salomon bonus target calculated?
[03:13:55] Shareholder (Chris Stavrou, New York): Chris Stavrou from New York. According to the latest Salomon Brothers proxy, if Deryck earns 30% on allocated equity of Salomon Brothers, provided that that’s at least 10% above the return for competitors, he could earn a bonus of $24 million. My question is whether that return number is reduced by a charge for preferred dividends.







Why does Salomon trade at such a discount to Coke?
[03:15:46] Shareholder (Chris Davis, New York): Hi, Chris Davis again from New York. I wanted to ask if you, I feel there’s such a huge discrepancy between the valuation of some of your holdings versus others in terms of the market valuation, in terms of price to earnings, price to book. In your opinion, do the growth prospects of Salomon Brothers, or the quality, or your anticipation of your ability to clip the coupons at Salomon Brothers, justify such a dramatic discount to the growth prospects of Coca-Cola or Gillette, in terms of our ability as Berkshire shareholders to clip those coupons? And if you could explain, or perhaps share your thoughts on why the market perception, if it is, justifies that distinction.

And our guess would be that, you know, we would feel reasonably good about anything that we owned in terms of the price at which we bought it and the facts of the time we bought it, and the facts change over time. Salomon, I think, is a better company now than it was some years back, but it’s still in a business that’s, can be very volatile, and it has a small amount, as does any investment banking firm, and as any commercial banking firm, of systemic risk. I mean, you can’t get rid of that. Charlie, you want to…


How do you work out the intrinsic value of a business?
[03:18:10] Shareholder (Sean Barry, Regina, Canada): Thank you. Sean Barry, Regina, Canada. Mr. Buffett, you’ve indicated that most of us in this room could acquire a lot of the information that you and Charlie acquired through the annual reports, yet you both also indicated that the GAAP rules a lot of times leave a little to be desired. Could you perhaps give an indication as to how you and Charlie come up with the economic value, or the intrinsic value, of the businesses that you finally decide to invest in, and a little bit about the process that you go through with that? Thank you.

The, so we are looking for things where we feel fairly high degree of probability that we can come within a range of looking at those numbers out over a period of time, and then we discount them back. And we are more concerned with the certainty of those numbers than we are with getting the one that looks absolutely the cheapest, but based upon numbers that we don’t have any, they don’t have great confidence in. And that’s basically what economic value is all about. The numbers in any accounting report mean nothing per se as to economic value. There are guidelines to tell you something about how to get at economic value, but they don’t tell you anything. It, there are no answers in the financial statements. There are guidelines to enable you to figure out the answer, and to figure out that answer you have to understand something about business.
You don’t have to understand a lot about mathematics. I mean, the math is not complicated, but you do have to understand something about the business. But that’s the same thing you would do if you’re going to buy an apartment house or a farm or any other small business you might be interested in. You would try to figure out what you are laying out currently and what you are likely to get back over time, and how certain you felt about getting it, and how it compared to other alternatives. That’s all we do. We just do it with large businesses, basically. The account, the county figures are very hopeful to us in the sense that they generally guide us to what we should be thinking about. And of course, if we find numbers where it looks like people are taking the most optimistic interpretation of things that they can’t under GAAP and all of that, we get very worried about people who look like they massage the numbers in any way, and there are plenty of people that do. Zone 3.
What growth rate and margin of safety does Buffett use?
[03:21:48] Shareholder (Howard Baskin, Kansas City): I’m Howard Baskin from Kansas City. When you are estimating a growth rate on a company, I met of a very predictable company, I imagine you apply a big margin of safety to it. What kind of rate do you generally apply? I mean, high single digits in the margin of safety, or what kind of growth rate would you, on a predictable company, might you…

There’s a huge difference in the business that grows and requires a lot of capital to do so and the business that grows and doesn’t require capital. And I would say that generally financial analysts do not give adequate weight to the difference in those. In fact, it’s amazing how little attention is paid to that. Believe me, if you’re investing, you should pay a lot of attention to it. Charlie?

How is Berkshire’s capital allocated, and what can investors learn from Keynes?
TL;DR: Buffett said he and Munger allocate all the capital with no staff. He recommended the market chapter in Keynes’s General Theory.

Who helps Buffett and Munger allocate capital?
[03:24:12] Shareholder (Byron Wien, New York): Byron Wien from New York. You said that you decentralized the operating decisions but centralized the capital allocation decisions. What kind of staff do you have in Omaha to help you with the capital allocation decisions and the stock selection decisions you make, or do you and Charlie do that pretty much by yourselves?

And if you take a CEO that’s in a job for 10 years, and he has a business that earns, say, 12% on equity, and he’s, and he pays out a third, that means he’s got 8% per year of equity. I mean, when you think of his tenure in office, how much capital he’s allocated, it’s an enormous factor over time. And yet probably relatively few chief executives are either trained for or are selected on the basis of their ability to allocate capital. I mean, they get there through other routes. So I’ve said it’s like, you know, somebody playing the piano all their life and then getting to Carnegie Hall and they hand them a violin. I mean, it is a different function than most, than the route, than the functions that exist along the routes to the CEO’s job at most companies.
And so many CEOs, when they get there, think they can solve it by either having a staff that does it or by hiring consultants or whatever it may be. And in our view, that is, you know, that’s a terrible mistake, because it is, if not the key function of the CEO, it’s one of two or three key functions at, say, 80% or 90% of all companies. And if you can’t do it yourself, you’re going to make a lot of mistakes. It may make a lot of mistakes even if you do it yourself. But if you, you know, you wouldn’t want anybody in any other position of that importance in the company essentially saying, “I don’t know how to do this, so I’m going to have somebody else do it,” when it’s their key responsibility. But that’s the way it works in business.
And Charlie and I take responsibility for all capital allocation decisions, other than just sort of routine expenditures at the operating businesses, and we don’t get into those at all. I mean, if our managers are spending $3 or $4 million a year on machinery, or one of them is, I mean, a machinery, equipment, plants, new leases, we have no review process on that. We don’t have a staff and headquarters. We don’t waste the time to do that. We think those people know how to allocate. But the money that relates to the actual operations of their business, we think in terms of the capital that is generated above that, that’s our job. Charlie?



We both use it personally. I mean, I keep a set at the office and a set at home, and I give away more of that product than any other product that Berkshire Hathaway makes in any subsidiary. It’s a perfectly fabulous human achievement to edit a thing to make that user friendly, and with that much wisdom encapsulated. It is a, it’s a fabulous thing.

What can investors learn from John Maynard Keynes?
[03:29:48] Shareholder (Houston, Texas): Pastor Dukhan from Houston, Texas. From time to time you have quoted John Maynard Keynes, the British economies, so I would assume that you have read his investment writings very extensively. What are two or three investment relations, in your opinion, one can learn from that economist?

Keynes and Graham, from vastly different starting points, came to the same conclusion at about the same time, in the ’30s, as to the soundest way to invest over time. They differed some on their ideas on diversification. Keynes believed in diversifying far less than did Graham. But Keynes started off with the wrong theory, I would say, in the ’20s, and he essentially tried to predict business cycles and markets, and then shifted to fundamental analysis of businesses in the ’30s, and did extremely well. And about the same time, Graham was writing as this first material. I think Janet Lowe, in her book on Ben Graham, actually has a little correspondence that took place between Keynes and Ben. So I would advise you to read that. And there’s some letters of his, that he, of Keynes’s, that he wrote to co-trustees of life insurance societies and colleges and so on, that I think you’d find interesting too. It’s 1:15, and Charlie and I have to go to our directors’ meeting at Berkshire, which starts in about 15 minutes, so we thank you all for coming.
This is our own transcription of the 1994 Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting video, edited for easy reading. The words spoken by Warren Buffett, Charlie Munger and the other speakers remain theirs. Video © Berkshire Hathaway and CNBC, as applicable.
Watch the official video: CNBC Warren Buffett Archive, 1994 meeting.





